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Abstract
Recent developments in Turkish derivatives markets demonstrate the increasing importance of risk management
not only for individual banks but also for the entire system. In this context, this study analyzes the counterparty
credit risk of OTC derivatives. The analysis is based on a hypothetical portfolio that is characterized by key aspects
of the instruments banks hold. Thus, the portfolio consists of vanilla swaps, which dominate banks’ transactions.
By simulating market risk factors, we come up with proxy risk exposure figures for the whole banking system. Af-
ter a proper adjustment, these figures have been compared with the risk weighted assets, which includes credit risk,
as well as with the capital. Consequently, we observe that the counterparty credit risk resulting from the use of OTC
derivatives is relatively small for the Turkish banking system. Nevertheless, in light of the new regulatory frame-
work introduced by Basel III, the importance of credit and market liquidity risk for the OTC instruments in trading
portfolios is expected to increase in the near future.    
Keywords: Counterparty credit risk, OTC derivatives, swaps, Basel II, valuation. 
JEL Codes: C15, E44, G21, G32
Türkiye’de Tergahüstü Piyasalardan Kaynakl› Karﬂ› Taraf Riski
Özet
Türkiye’de tezgah üstü (OTC) türev piyasalar›nda yaﬂanan geliﬂmeler, risk yönetimini hem bankalar hem de siste-
min bütünü için giderek daha önemli k›lmaktad›r. Buna paralel olarak, bu çal›ﬂmada OTC türevlerine iliﬂkin karﬂ›
taraf kredi riski analiz edilmektedir. Yap›lan analiz bankalar›n portöyünde yer alan ürünlerin temel özelliklerini ta-
ﬂ›yan varsay›msal bir portföye dayanmaktad›r. Dolay›s›yla, portföy, bankalar›n a¤›rl›kl› olarak iﬂlem yapt›¤› vanil-
la türü swaplardan oluﬂmaktad›r. Çal›ﬂmada, piyasa risk faktörlerinin simüle edilmesiyle, bankac›l›k sektörünün ta-
mam› için riske maruz pozisyon tutarlar› elde edilmiﬂtir. Uygun dönüﬂtürmelere tabi tutulan tutar kredi riskini içe-
ren risk a¤›rl›kl› aktifler ve sermaye ile karﬂ›laﬂt›r›lm›ﬂt›r. Buna göre, OTC türevlerinden ileri gelen karﬂ› taraf kre-
di riskinin Türk bankac›l›k sektörü için göreli olarak düﬂük oldu¤u gözlenmiﬂtir. Buna karﬂ›n, kredi riski ve piya-
sa likiditesi riskinin önemi de dikkate al›nd›¤›nda, Basel III kapsam›nda gelen yeni uluslar aras› düzenlemeler ko-
nunun önemini art›rmaktad›r. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Karﬂ› taraf kredi riski, OTC türevleri, swap, Basel II, de¤erleme.
JEL Kodlar›: C15, E44, G21, G32
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INTRODUCTION
T
he recent global crisis has emphasized the
necessity for better risk management, especi-
ally for banks. OTC derivatives are widely
used for hedging risk; however, the risk involved
in the use of OTC derivatives is vital as well. With
the realization of this risk, there was a tendency to
blame the financial models and derivatives for trig-
gering the global financial crisis. As is mentioned
in Derman (2011), overreliance on quantitative
models could be fatal. No matter how good a quan-
titative model is, it is only a model, not the reality.
On the other hand, data alone have no voice. Mo-
dels and quantitative tools are helpful to benefit
from the data. Hence it is important to combine the
intuitive kind of knowledge with quantitative tools.
As Gregory (2010) indicates, models tend to be
viewed as either “good” or “bad” depending on the
underlying market conditions; whereas in reality,
models can be good or bad depending on how they
are used. In parallel, we believe that derivatives
and models can perform the role which they are
mainly designed for only if they are used in the
right way and the inherent risk is well-managed.
Solely blaming the models and quantitative tools
does not seem to be a solution.
New regulations and the ongoing sovereign
debt crisis in the Euro-zone are named as the key
challenges for 2012 (Risk Magazine, 2012). Zoo-
ming in the former, this study elaborates the OTC
derivatives with a particular emphasis on counter-
party credit risk (CCR). Especially, since the on-
set of the recent global crisis, OTC derivatives’
complex, opaque and bilateral nature has been un-
der discussion. The ongoing regulatory actions in-
tend to make OTC derivatives as much standard
as possible and have them traded on exchan-
ges/electronic platforms. In order to increase
transparency, OTC transactions are to be reported
to trade repositories (FSB, 2011). If the system
works in the directions of the incentives brought
by the regulations, then financial system and the
real economy are very likely to benefit from the
efforts underway. However, there are many facets
of the new coming framework. And this mostly
depends on how the markets will approach to the
reforms. More transparency would contribute to
market efficiency and risk management; however
it may result in sub-optimal consequences (Coﬂ-
kun, 2011). Finally, to mitigate the CCR, margin
requirements and central counterparties are the fo-
cal point of the new regulations (IOSCO, 2011).
The implications of these reforms for Turkey are
closely monitored by the authorities (CBRT,
2011). 
In this study the goal is to measure the CCR
of banks operating in Turkey. The exposure at de-
fault figures are estimated on the built portfolio
with the Monte-Carlo simulations. The results
imply that the CCR is relatively small in Turkey.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents some key concepts on CCR. Sec-
tion III provides certain aspects of OTC derivati-
ves in the global markets and in Turkey. Section
IV contains the data and the model used in the
analysis. Section V includes the assessment of the
results of the analysis. Finally, section VI sums up
concluding remarks. 
I. FRAMEWORK
IAIS (2004) defines credit risk as the risk of
financial loss resulting from default or movement
in the credit quality of issuers of securities, deb-
tors, or counterparties and intermediaries, to
whom the company has an exposure. Specifically,
CCR is defined by BCBS (2005) as the bilateral
credit risk of transactions with uncertain exposu-
res that can vary over time with the movement of
underlying market factors. CCR could arise from
other transactions such as repos and reverse repos;
however in this study, CCR coming from OTC
derivatives is subject of concern. Unlike the tradi-
tional credit risk, CCR creates a bilateral risk of
loss such that the market value of the transaction
can be positive or negative to either counterparty.
Banks’ CCR exposures should be adequately ca-
pitalized. To determine the required capital for
CCR, exposure at default is calculated based on
different methods: (i) current exposure method
(CEM), (ii) standard method (SM), and (iii) inter-
nal model method (IMM). The last method is eva-
luated to be the most risk sensitive one for quan-
tifying CCR. At present, CEM is the commonly
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used method, where it is based on replacement
cost (mark-to-market) of the transactions plus an
add-on that is proxy for the potential future expo-
sure (BCBS, 2005). The new international regula-
tions tend to join CEM and SM under one frame
and come up with a more risk sensitive standard
method as an alternative to IMM. 
In this study, under the Internal Models Met-
hod (IMM), the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation ba-
sed approach is applied. The main steps in calcu-
lating the CCR, in line with Gregory (2010), and
Pykhtin and Zhu (2007), are as follows: 
(i) Relevant market risk factors are chosen. To do
this, the underlying randomness behind the
OTC instruments and the embedded inter-rela-
tion are considered. Commonly, spot interest
rates and FX rates are used as risk factors. 
(ii) Scenario generation is the next step. Genera-
ting market scenarios via simulation of these
risk factors rests upon the stochastic proces-
ses of the risk factors. The parameters in the
processes could be based on risk-neutral me-
asure or the real measure. Generally, for the
risk management purposes, the latter is pre-
ferred. 
(iii) Under the generated scenarios, the instru-
ments are revalued to see how their values
evolve through time and accordingly the re-
sultant risk for the counterparties are estima-
ted. 
(iv) Finally, the revalued figures are aggregated
to find counterparty-level exposure by app-
lying necessary netting rules. And the results
are validated by necessary tools and intuition.
The IMM method requires calculating the
EAD (Exposure at Default) depending on the
internal calibration of effective expected po-
sitive exposure. 
To understand the steps of the model, it is im-
portant to clarify the concepts used in CCR frame-
work. The concepts associated to CCR are as in
Table 1:
Table 1: CounterParty Credit Risk Concepts
Concept Definition
Counterparty Exposure Larger of zero and the market value of the portfolio of derivative positions with a counterparty 
that would be lost if the counterparty were to default and there were zero recovery. 
Current Exposure (CE) Current value of the exposure to a counterparty. The amount at risk should the counterparty 
defaults now and is normally assumed to be the mark-to-market (MtM) value of that trade. 
Marked-to-Market (MtM) Value MtM represents replacement cost, which defines the enrty point into an equivalent transaction(s) 
with another counterparty, under assumption of no transaction costs. Expected MtM is the 
forward or expected value of a transaction at some point in the future
Potential Future Exposure (PFE) Maximum exposure estimated to occur on a future date at a high degree of statistical confidence. 
PFE has a stochastic nature. 
Expected Exposure (EE) Probability-weighted average exposure estimated to exist on a future date. 
Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) Time-weighted average of individual EEs estimated for given forecasting horizons. 
Effective EE Constrained EE which is non-decreasing for maturities below one year.
Effective EPE Average of effective EE. Maximum PFE is the highest PFE value over a given time interval.
CVA/DVA CVA (Credit Valuation Adjustment) is defined as the difference between the value of a 
derivative assumming the counterparty is default-risk free and the value reflecting default risk of 
the counterparty. DVA (Debit Valuation Adjustment) is the difference between the value of the 
derivative assuming the bank is default-risk free and the value reflecting default risk of the bank. 
Changes in bank’s own credit risk result in changes in the DVA component of the valuation of the 
banks’ derivatives.
Right way/Wrong way Exposures Positively/negatively correlated exposures with the credit quality of the counterparty. In other 
words, a significant unfavorable correlation between the value of a derivative contract and the 
likelihood of default of a counterparty.
Credit Risk Mitigants There are many ways to mitigate or limit counterparty credit risk. Trading with high-quality coun
terparties, diversification, netting, collateralisation, and hedging (i.e. with credit derivatives). A 
centralised clearing house is also an important risk mitigant provided that the clearing house itself 
is default-remote.
Source: BCBS (2005), BCBS (2011), Canabarro and Duffie (2003), Pykhtin and Zhu (2006), and Gregory (2010). 
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Basel III brings capital charges for banks’ co-
unterparty exposures to CCPs, where under Basel
II, transactions with the CCPs were not capitali-
zed at all. The methods to calibrate CCR are un-
der re-construction. As for non-centrally cleared
OTC derivatives, margining requirements are un-
derway. Basel III brings additional capital charge
connected to market risk component of CCR, na-
mely credit value adjustment (CVA). CVA is de-
signed for the bilateral transactions and does not
cover the centrally-cleared derivatives. Another
important new coming issue is the market liqui-
dity of the OTC derivatives. 
II. OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS:
FACTS AND FIGURES
Why are the OTC derivatives this much sub-
ject of concern? The increasing tendency and the
high amount of the OTC transactions account for
the rising interest in OTC derivatives. Globally,
according to the BIS (2011), the OTC derivatives
market reached $708 trillion in total notional outs-
tanding amounts and $20 trillion in gross market
value as of September 2011. Among the OTC de-
rivatives interest rate derivatives constitute the
largest portion (Chart 1). In Turkey, as of June
2012, the banking sector balance sheet size is aro-
und 1.5 trillion, where the total off balance she-
et items amount to 1.2 trillion. Approximately,
a half of the off-balance sheet amount corres-
ponds to OTC derivatives. However, since both
legs of the derivatives transactions are included in
the off-balance sheet figures, the below chart pre-
sents half of the amounts. As for the composition,
currency swaps dominate the system (Chart 2).
The figures in banks’ off-balance sheets are
in nominal terms. According to current regulati-
ons of BRSA and also market practices, derivati-
ves are recorded to off-balance sheet accounts at
their purchase costs involving transaction costs.
Subsequently, the derivative transactions are valu-
ed at their fair values and the changes in their fair
values are recorded on balance sheet under the
sub-accounts named as “derivative financial as-
sets/liabilities held for trading”. In accordance
with the Turkish accounting standard no. 39, “Fi-
nancial Instruments: Recognition and Measure-
ment”, derivatives are classified based on the na-
ture/purpose of the transaction as “hedging” or
“trading”. Derivatives held for trading purposes
are measured at fair value in the statement of fi-
nancial position. Changes in the fair value of deri-
vatives that are designated and qualify as trading
purposes are recognized in income immediately.
Although OTC derivative trades are commonly
for hedging, due to complex accounting treat-
ments, banks tend to report them as trading purpo-
ses. This makes the market risk component of
CCR highly important for the banks due to the ad-
justments by marking to market. 
Source: BRSA. Source: BIS
Chart 1. OTC Derivatives-Global (%) Chart 2.OTC Derivatives-Turkey (%)
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III. DATA AND MODEL
This study depends on a simple hypothetical swap portfolio S= {S
$
IRS, S€
IRS, S IRS, S
$
CS, S€
CS}, whe-
re IRS and CS stand for interest rate and currency swaps, respectively. Based on the common charac-
teristics of the swaps in banks’ portfolios (BRSA, 2011), this study focuses on 5-year IRS and 1-year
CS with different currency types. Building the portfolios is followed by the construction of the scena-
rios for the market risk factors. In terms of the general analytical approach, this study is in parallel to
Heller and Vause (2012)5. The data and the methodology used in the model are briefly described below:
To illustrate the valuation process, the following generic swaps are presented as examples:           
(i) 5-year IRS on $1 notional, pay fixed and receive floating with semiannual payments,
(ii) 1-year CS on 1$ notional, pay floating on , and receive fixed on $, with semiannual payments.
5 In the mentioned study, Heller and Vause (2012) estimate the amount of collateral that central counterparties should demand to clear safely all interest rate swap
and credit deafult swap positions of the major derivatives dealers. Their estimates are based on potential lossess on a set of hypothetical dealer portfolios that
capture the key characteristics of the actual portfolios. Further, they found the changes in market values of the portfolios based on joint probability distributi-
ons. The analogy between this study and our study comes from the fact that both rely on a hypothetical portfolio as a proxy for the actual ones. 
Table 2: Data and Methodology
Stage Explanation
Factors Interest rates and FX rates are the relevant risk factors for the hypothetical swap portfolio. For both the IRS
and CS, we use  the relevant Libor and Swap rates for various maturities on ($, €, ) which are compiled
from Bloomberg. The missing maturities are acquired by interpolation. As for the FX rates, :$ and :€
effective rates are used.
Scenarios The scenarios for the market risk factors are acquired by Monte-Carlo simulation. To do this, the random
number generation based on the M-dimensional multivariate diffusion process of the form is used; 
dXt = (A – BXt)dt + ηt ; where Xt is an M dimensional continuous time process, A and B are M x M and M
x 1 matrices, and ηt is a vector random process with uncorrelated increments and covariance matrix Σdt. 
More specifically, within this multidimensional system, we assume that 
(i) (i) short term interest rates evolve according to Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) 
model: drt = κ(α – rt)dt + σrvrtdW
r
t,
(ii) (ii) FX returns follow Geometric Brownian Motion 
dSt(GBM):––– = μdt + σFXdWtFX,St
(iii) where κ is the speed of adjustment, α is the  long run mean of short rate (i.e., the level), dWt is the incre-
ment of  Wiener process, μ is the mean of returns on currencies, finally σrvrt is the volatility of the short rate. 
Valuation A swap’s price is its fixed rate. To find the fixed rate ∀Sji ∈S, the main formula used is:
1–B0(hn)FS(0, n,m) = ––––––––, where FS is the fixed rate and the interest payments occur on days hj such that ∑njB0(hj)
j∈{1,2,..n}. The time interval between payments is m days. Finally, B0(hj) is the present value factor on a
zero-coupon instrument paying 1$, or € at its maturity date (CFA Level II, Derivatives and Portfolio
Management, Volume 6, 2012). Based on the generated scenarios, we revalue the individual positions at each
point in time in the future. At the start of a swap, the market value is zero (please see the illustration on the
next page). 
Aggregation The portfolio weights w= {W$
IRS, W€
IRS, WIRS, W$
CS W€
CS} are set proportionately to the share of each of the
relevant swap type in the total swap portfolio of the Turkish banking sector, based on the off-balance sheet
figures. Thus, {WIRS = 1/3 & WCS = 2/3}, whereas in terms of currency type, the allocation is equally distrib-
uted within each type, IRS and CS. The resultant EAD values are aggregated with their absolute values so it
is assumed that ∃ mitigation effects, i.e. netting and collateralization. 
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The figures are just for illustrative purposes. Since the currency swap has 1 year maturity, the tab-
le includes only the rates on for the 1 year. 
1-0.8302
-For the IRS, the fixed rate = ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– = 0.0188,
0.9804+0.9611+0.9426+0.9247+0.9076+0.8912+0.8750+0.8597+0.8446+0.8302
so the annualized rate is around 3.77%. 
After pricing the IRS, 10-days later the swap value with new rates: 
3.77     1
Fixed= –––– x –– x (0.9814+0.9620+0.9435+0.9255+0.9084+0.8918+0.8756+0.8599+0.8447+0.8300)+1x0.8300 = 0.9999.
1.00     2
1       4.00 
Floating=(1+ –– x –––– ) x 0.9814=1.001. Market value of the swap to the fixed payer: 1.001-0.9999=0.0012 for $1 notional.
2       2.00
1-0.9611
-For the CS, $ side the fixed rate = –––––––––––-– x 2 =4%. 
0.9804+0.9611
4        1
10-d later fixed= –––– x –– x (0.9814+0.9620)+1x0.9620 =1.0009. 
100      2
1       9
After 10 days, floating side on equals to (1+ –– x ––––) x 0.9588=1.0019. 
2     100
We assume that the spot FX rate is $1 = 1.5, and 10-d later the rate increases to $1 = 1.6. Thus,
floating notional= 1.5 and 10-d later equals to (1.5x1.0019/1.6)= $0.9393. Finally, net value to the
floating payer is 1.0009-0.9393 = 0.0616$ for $1 notional.
Table3: Valuation of IRS and CS
Today %$ % 10-d Later %$ % Elaborations for Today$ Elaborations for 10-d Later$
1 1
180-d 4.00 9 170-d Libor 4.01 9.1 D(180) = ––––––––––––––– = 0.9804 D(170) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.9814
Libor 4         180 4.01       1701+(––––)X–––– 1+(––––)X––––-
100       360 100        360
1 1
360-d 4.05 9.1 350-d Libor 4.06 9.2 D(360) = ––––––––––––––– = 0.9611 D(350) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.9620
Libor 4.06       360 4.06       3501+(––––)X–––– 1+(––––)X––––-
100        360 100        360
1 1
540-d 4.06 530-d Libor 4.07 D(540) = ––––––––––––––– = 0.9426 D(530) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.9435
4.06       540 4.07       530
1+(––––)X–––– 1+(––––)X––––-Libor 100        360 100        360
1 1
720-d 4.07 710-d Libor 4.08 D(720) = ––––––––––––––– = 0.9247 D(710) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.9255
4.07      720 4.08      710
1+(––––)X–––- 1+(––––)X–––-Libor 100       360 100       360
1 1
900-d 4.07 890-d Libor 4.08 D(900) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.9076 D(890) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.9084
4.07       900 4.08       890
1+(––––)X––––- 1+(––––)X––––Libor 100        360 100        360
1 1
1080-d 4.07 1070-d Libor 4.08 D(1080) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8912 D(1070) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8918
4.08       1080 4.08       1070
1+(––––)X––––– 1+(––––)X–––––Libor 100        360 100        360
1 1
1260-d 4.08 1250-d Libor 4.09 D(1260) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8750 D(1250) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8756
4.08       1060 4.09       1250
1+(––––)X––––– 1+(––––)X–––––Libor 100        360 100        360
1 1
1440-d 4.08 1430-d Libor 4.10 D(1440) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8597 D(1430) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8599
4.08       1440 4.10       1430
1+(––––)X––––– 1+(––––)X–––––Libor 100        360 100        360
1 1
1620-d 4.09 1610-d Libor 4.11 D(1620) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8446 D(1610) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8447
4.09       1620 4.11       1620
1+(––––)X––––– 1+(––––)X–––––Libor 100        360 100       360
1 1
1800-d 4.09 1790-d Libor 4.12 D(1800) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8302 D(1790) = –––––––––––––––– = 0.8300
4.09       1800 4.12       1800
1+(––––)X––––– 1+(––––)X–––––Libor 100        360 100        360
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In the above valuation process, when we si-
mulate the interest rate term structures and the
FX rates, we come up with a distribution for the
MtM values of swaps. These acquired distributi-
ons allow us to conduct statistical inference from
the theoretical aspects of the replicated portfoli-
o and help to quantify CCR. Calibration of IMM
depends on EAD = α x EEPE, where the EEPE
(the effective EPE), is the average of effective
expected exposure that is derived from the simu-
lated MtM values. For regulatory capital calcu-
lation purposes, EPE should be multiplied by
alpha. Under IMM, alpha is fixed at a level of
1.4, where banks can calculate different alpha
upon the approval from the authorities. Accor-
ding to BCBS (2005), banks often use PFE when
measuring CCR exposure against counterparty
limits. We use PFE as well and apply the same
alpha parameter to ∀Sji w/o distinguishing the
counterparties. However, due to the simple natu-
re of the portfolio, a penalty factor Ω is applied
to EAD of the eventual portfolio in order to cap-
ture the risk of other types of instruments not
only for their complexity but also for the additio-
nal amount. The acquired EAD is adjusted to
reflect the system by applying the total swap
portfolio amount in banks’ portfolios as notio-
nal. Eventually, we acquire the course of poten-
tial future exposure (PFE) and the EE. Based on
PFE, we can be 95 % certain that the exposure to
one counterparty will not exceed certain $ amo-
unt in a given time period where the trading
portfolio of the counterparty is static.  
In our model all the swap instruments are
assumed to be in the trading portfolio. That is to
say, speculative accounting treatment is
applied. The implication of that is the marking
to market adjustments coming from the swap
revaluation is completely assumed to be reflec-
ted in profit and loss account. We are aware of
the fact that the risk profile can change with the
specification of the cash flows. Apart from that,
to be conservative, while quantifying the CCR,
we impose a credit risk penalty with assumed
default probability. This default probability fac-
tor is integrated to the counterparty credit risk
1+discount rate
analysis as in –––––––––––––––––– while reva-
1–default probability
luing the swaps. Hence the discount rates become
larger with the credit risk adjustment. While
analyzing the whole system, we aggregate the ex-
posures with their absolute values to eliminate
any mitigation effect from the netting. Finally, the
capital charge, which is calculated as EAD x Co-
unterparty RW x 8% is calculated. RW is a func-
tion of the credit quality of the counterparty, ex-
pected recovery and effective maturity. Also, re-
coveries with collaterals are not considered under
our conservative approach, so we assume LGD as
100%. For each simulation we assumed different
default probabilities, however, we report the ones
only for 5 percent. For simplicity, we assume no
transaction cost. As for now, wrong way risk and
CVA are left for further study. Model validation is
mostly done through comparing the resulted ex-
posures to the banks’ capital and risk weighted as-
set reporting based on SM. The CCR is reported
in the credit RWA after being converted to credits
with appropriate pre-set conversion factors. For
the IRS, we take the said factor as 4%, whereas
for the CS we use the factor 2%. In the analysis
we assume the risk weights for the products as
100 %.
IV. RESULTS
As seen from Table 4, the total loan equiva-
lent value is $16 billion. This is considerably
small portion of the total credit RWA, which is
around $445 billion, where the total RWA is aro-
und $521 billion as of January 2012 according to
the BRSA’s Interactive Monthly Bulletin-Febru-
ary 2012. Although the OTC transactions tend to
increase, currently the vanilla nature and low
amount of OTC products in banks’ off-balance
sheet imply that CCR stemming from the OTC
derivatives does not constitute a fatal risk for the
banking system in Turkey. It is clear that as the
credit conversion factors are increased, the loan
equivalent values will be higher thus CCR will
have bigger portion in total RWA. The output for
the simulations and the IIM is below.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Counterparty credit risk generally refers to
the bilateral credit risk of transactions with uncer-
tain exposures that can vary over time with the
movement of underlying market factors. OTC de-
rivatives have played a major role during the 2008
global financial crisis. The risks attached to these
products have proved to be vital not only for the
financial institutions but also for the system as a
whole. However, Turkey is one of the countries,
which were decoupled from the advanced econo-
mies during the crisis. This is mostly due to the re-
latively small amount of OTC derivatives transac-
tions and their vanilla nature.  In this study, we
show that counterparty credit risk arising from the
OTC derivatives for the banks does not constitute
fatal risk compared to the total credit risk in Tur-
key. However, the increasing tendency of OTC
derivatives in Turkey and the new coming regula-
tions urge more elaborated risk assessment pro-
cess in this area. Also, it should be noted that
bank-by-bank analysis could lead significant risk
for some banks due to their relatively larger deri-
vatives portfolio and the correlations between the
assets are of great importance as well. Further
study could include other types of derivatives in
the portfolio while taking into account the CVA
and liquidity risk as part of the market risk com-
ponent of OTC derivatives.
Chart 3. Term Structure-Euro (%) Chart 4. Term Structure -Dollar (%)
Chart 5. Term Structure -TL (%) Table4: The IMM results for CCR
Swap PFE ($)
S$
IRS 2.509.911.177
S€
IRS 2.465.906.166
S IRS 2.861.772.610
Total IRS 7.837.589.953
S$
CS 18.820.294.723
S€
CS 45.629.512.474
Total CS 64.449.807.197
Grand Total 72.287.397.150
Total EAD 1.012.023.560.102
Loan Equivalent Value 16.024.997.421
- The figures are our own elaborations.
- Since the credit RWA is by far the highest RWA type among the total RWA and the capital adequacy ratios are high, comparing the calculated RWA of CCR
to the total credit RWA provides intuition about how dangerous is the CCR for the banks operating in Turkey.
- In the analysis, we mainly assume that the banks use swaps to hedge themselves against the floating rate loans, so for the currency swaps, banks pay float-
ing rate on TL and receive fixed rate on foreign currency. However, to be conservative, we take the negative exposure as the ones belonging to the banks
operating in Turkey.
– Default rate is taken as 5 %. -The figures for TL swaps are higher due to the extra shock to TL yield curve.
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